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PERSONAL JURISDICTION FOR COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT ON THE INTERNET
Christian M. Rieder* & Stacy P. Pappas"
I. INTRODUCTION
For generations, the judicial system has dealt with how
to maintain an individual's right to due process when exer-
cising personal jurisdiction. This problem has become even
more difficult with the development of the Internet,' which
readily connects millions of people around the world. The In-
ternet is a digital world without borders. An increasing
number of courts have already realized that the Internet,
more than any other medium, will challenge the determina-
tion of personal jurisdiction in both the national and interna-
tional context.
Currently, one of the most important substantive legal
issues in on-line communication is the infringement of copy-
righted works.2 The key issue in enforcing copyrights over
the Internet is the question of jurisdiction. A finding of ju-
risdiction over an out-of state or foreign Internet user sky-
rockets the cost of a lawsuit by forcing a defendant to litigate
in an unfamiliar forum.' Therefore, the determination of ju-
* Christian M. Rieder is currently practicing intellectual property law
with the firm of Schlawien, Habel & Straessner in Munich, Germany. He re-
ceived his J.D. at the University of Wuertzburg in Germany, and his L.L.M. in
Intellectual Property at The John Marshall Law School.
** Stacy P. Pappas is currently practicing corporate law with the firm of
Stotis & Baird, Chartered in Chicago, Illinois. She received her J.D. at DePaul
University College of Law.
1. The Internet is a network of shared information. Physically, the Inter-
net uses a subset of the total resources of all the currently existing telecommu-
nication networks. Technically, what distinguishes the Internet as a coopera-
tive public network is its use of a set of protocols called TCP/IP (Transmission
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol). See also Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union, No. 96-571, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4037, at *11-*18 (June 26, 1997)
(providing detailed description of how the Internet works).
2. Patrick F. McGowan, The Internet and Intellectual Property Issues, 455
PLI/PAT 303, 376 (1996). There is no dispute that the amount of trademark
disputes about domain name registration is much higher. However, this is a
much narrower problem between registrants and trademark holders.
3. J. Powers, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Limitless Jurisdiction?, IN-
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risdiction is critical, for it has a potentially devastating eco-
nomic impact on the parties.
The exercise of personal jurisdiction can have other eco-
nomic repercussions that stem from the ability of a plaintiff
to target certain parties as defendants. A plaintiff may be
likely to allege liability against a defendant who may not be
directly involved in the act of copyright infringement, but
may have deep financial pockets. In the context of litigation
based on Internet activities, the "deep pockets" defendant is
most likely the Internet service provider.' Although these de-
fendants are attractive to plaintiffs for their finances, rules
governing personal jurisdiction may prevent defendants from
being forced into court if they are too remote from the plain-
tiffs injury.
The question of U.S. jurisdiction becomes even more im-
portant when one considers that the Internet reaches mil-
lions of people worldwide. The ability to infringe another's
copyright over the Internet increases the quantity of poten-
tial foreign defendants. For example, a typical scenario arose
in the case of Playboy v. Chuckleberry.' In Playboy, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York sentenced an Italian defendant to shut down the access
of a United States user to its Italian Web server.' Although
the action involved an alleged trademark infringement, this
case demonstrates that a copyright infringement action
would probably present similar jurisdictional problems.7
Several authors have recently commented on the issue of
TERACTIVE MARKETING NEWS, Mar. 3, 1996. Possibly, the costs of a defense
could have been one reason for the defendant in CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,
89 F.3d 1257, 1261 (6th Cir. 1996), neither to file an appellate brief nor to ap-
pear at oral argument in the out-of-state forum.
4. An "internet service provider" ("ISP") is a company that provides indi-
viduals and other companies access to the Internet. An ISP owns or rents the
equipment required to have points-of-presence on the Internet for the geo-
graphic area served. See <httpV/whatis.com> (visited Feb. 16, 1998).
5. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
6. Id. The court ordered either to shut down the Internet site completely
or refrain from accepting any new subscriptions from customers residing in the
US. Id. The plaintiff alleged trademark infringement, false designation of ori-
gin, unfair competition based on infringement of Plaintiffs common law trade-
mark rights, and violations of the New York Anti-Dilution Statute. Id.
7. Id. Although an injunction against the foreign defendant prohibited the
sale of Playmen magazine in the United States, the lack of any jurisdictional
analysis is highly questionable.
368 [Vol. 38
1998] PERSONAL JURISDICTION ON INTERNET 369
personal jurisdiction on the Internet.8 However, only one of
them has focused his analysis on personal jurisdiction for
copyright infringement on the Internet.! This is surprising
since the first wave of intellectual property lawsuits over the
Internet were copyright infringement actions and the eco-
nomic loss suffered by these infringed parties has been tre-
mendous. 10
This article discusses the limits of personal jurisdiction
arising from copyright infringement on the Internet. After a
brief introduction to the complexity of this problem, the
background section examines the framework of traditional
personal jurisdiction analysis." This article then suggests
that this traditional framework is well suited for today's con-
temporary copyright infringement on the Internet actions. 2
This article's central theory is that the greater the quality of
contacts the defendant has with the forum state via the In-
8. Compare, e.g., David Bender, Emerging Personal Jurisdictional Issues
on the Internet, 453 PLI/PAT 7 (1996); William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cy-
berspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 197 (1995); Robert A. Cinque, Making Cyberspace Safe for
Copyright: The Protection of Electronic Works in a Protocol to the Berne Con-
vention, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1258 (1995); Cynthia L. Counts & C. Amanda
Martin, Libel in Cyberspace: A Framework for Addressing Liability and Juris-
dictional Issues in This New Frontier, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1083 (1996); Todd H.
Flaming, The Rules of Cyberspace: Informal Law in a New Jurisdiction, 85 ILL.
B.J. 174 (1997); Gary L. Gassman, Internet Defamation: Jurisdiction in Cyber-
space and the Public Figure Doctrine, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
563 (1996); Gwenn M. Kalow, From the Internet to the Court: Exercising Juris-
diction Over the World Wide Web Communications, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241
(1997); Byron F. Marchant, On-line on the Internet: First Amendment and Intel-
lectual Property Uncertainties in the On-line World, 39 HOW. L.J. 477 (1996);
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1996);
Mark Sableman, Business on the Internet, Part I: Jurisdiction, 53 J. MO. B. 137
(1997); David L. Stott, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The Constitutinal
Boundary of Minimum Contacts Limited to a Web Site, 15 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 819 (1997); Leif Swedlof, Three Paradigms of Presence: A
Solution for Personal Jurisdiction on the Internet, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 337
(1997); Richard S. Zembek, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental Fair-
ness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 339
(1996).
9. See James H. Aiken, The Jurisdiction of Trademark and Copyright In-
fringement on the Internet, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1331 (1997) (describing the ex-
isting case law and his conclusion as merely a citation of Chief Justice Warren's
observation in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958)).
10. William J. Cook, Be Wary of Internet Casting Shadows on Copyright
Holders, CHICAGO LAWYER, April, 1996, at 60 (discussing how online data theft
causes losses of more than 10 billion US-Dollars annually).
11. See discussion infra Part II.
12. See discussion infra Part III.
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ternet, the greater the likelihood that personal jurisdiction
will be found."l In order to support this theory, this article
explains the factors that courts should consider when looking
at the quality of contacts a defendant has with a forum state
via the Internet." A substantial portion of this article ex-
amines the type of activities that can subject an out-of-state
content provider, 5 an Internet service provider, 1" or an out-of-
state uploader 17 to personal jurisdiction. Finally, this article
analyzes the existing case law and ascertains basic ap-
proaches for analyzing transmissions on Web servers,"s elec-
tronic mail communications, 9 and the Usenet. °
II. BACKGROUND
Personal jurisdiction is a mandatory precondition to the
adjudication of any lawsuit.2 Personal jurisdiction, also re-
ferred to as in personam jurisdiction, is the court's authority
over the personal rights and obligations of a defendant.22 It
is a "necessary predicate" before a court can hear the merits
of a claim.23 Absent personal jurisdiction, a court lacks the
power to issue an in personam judgment.
Personal jurisdiction in a copyright infringement action 24
13. See discussion infra Part III.
14. See discussion infra Part III.
15. See discussion infra Part III.A.1. A content provider is an individual
who makes content available to third parties. An individual on-line user who
has his own web site at his commercial on-line service, such as CompuServe, is
a content provider, even if he does not operate the server. However, a larger
content provider often operates a remote server as well. See
<http.//whatis.com> (visited Feb. 16, 1998).
16. See discussion infra Part III.A.2. A service provider in this context op-
erates a server. The service provider is usually not identical to the content
provider since they often lease their server space to third parties. See also su-
pra note 4.
17. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
18. See discussion infra Part III.A.
19. See discussion infra Part III.B.
20. See discussion infra Part III.C.
21. Perritt, Jr., supra note 8, at 13.
22. WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF
THE UNITED STATES 260 (1995) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727
(1877)).
23. Christopher Lyon, The Ninth Circuit's Approach to Personal Jurisdic-
tion in Intellectual Property Cases: How Long Is the Arm of California in
Reaching Foreign Defendants?, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 661, 662 (1995).
24. Federal copyright law is governed by 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1994). To
establish a claim of copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove both(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of
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is determined in accordance with general principles of juris-
diction by applying the forum state's "long-arm statute."
25
However, the "general principles" of personal jurisdiction are
anything but clear, and defining these principles has led to
abundant amounts of litigation.2 ' The United States Su-
preme Court has been criticized for the "obvious lack of clar-
ity" in the area of personal jurisdiction.2 7 The lack of clarity
in personal jurisdiction, compounded by the public's general
confusion over the Internet, cannot be expressed in a better
way than by Harvard law professor David Shapiro, a juris-
diction expert, who stated that when it comes to personal ju-
risdiction and the Internet, "[tihe problem is unbelievabl[y]
complex."28
In an attempt to add some clarity to the complexity, this
article will examine some current decisions that address per-
sonal jurisdiction in the context of on-line communication. 9
Most of the existing cases that examine personal jurisdiction
are trademark infringement actions regarding "domain name
disputes." ° Currently, no reported case explicitly addresses
personal jurisdiction for copyright infringement, therefore,
there is no specific legal precedent.2 ' Thus, it is useful to re-
view the general principles of the law of personal jurisdiction.
work that are original. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv.
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). A full discussion of what constitutes copyright
infringement is beyond the scope of this article. This article focuses on per-
sonal jurisdiction where the alleged copyright infringement takes place over the
Internet.
25. Russel J. Frackman, Litigating Copyright Cases, 419 PLI/PAT 7, 15
(1995).
26. See Lyon, supra note 23, at 662 ("[Als of April 14, 1993, at least 19,043
cases heard [in] federal district courts ... involved... personal jurisdiction."
(quoting Mona A. Lee, Burger King's Bifurcated Test for Personal Jurisdiction:
The Reasonableness Inquiry Impedes Judicial Economy and Threatens a De-
fendant's Due Process Rights, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 945, 968 n.2 (1993))).
27. Lyon, supra note 23, at 662. Today the affirmative bases of jurisdiction
are constitutionally permissible merely because they are traditional.
28. See David A. Price, Executive Update Lawsuits over Web Sites Plague
Companies from Afar, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, October 15, 1996, at A4, avail-
able in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 11862853.
29. See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. CIV 96-3620, 1997 WL 97097, at
*15-*20, (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997). The court mentioned and addressed almost
all previous decisions.
30. A domain name locates an organization or other entity on the Internet.
See <http'//whatis.com> (visited Feb. 16, 1998).
31. See Hearst Corp., 1997 WL 97097, at *15-*20. Virtually every decision
determined personal jurisdiction over the content provider, but not, for exam-
ple, over an Internet service provider.
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A. Legal History
Traditionally, American courts, state or federal, asserted
jurisdiction in one of two ways: (1) a court has jurisdiction
over a person when the person is physically present within
the territorial boundaries of the court and the person is
served with process while physically present, or (2) a court
has jurisdiction over a thing (or a tangible item) if it exists
within the court's territorial boundaries and is attached. 2 In
addition to asserting jurisdiction over persons or things
found physically within the forum state, more frequently,
courts assert jurisdiction by following a state's long-arm
statute.3 Long-arm statutes typically authorize the exercise
of jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the Constitution as
interpreted by a line of Supreme Court decisions beginning
with International Shoe Co. v. Washington.34
In International Shoe, the defendant, a Delaware com-
pany, was a shoe manufacturer with its principal place of
business in St. Louis, Missouri." The defendant's salesmen,
who were located in the forum state, Washington, solicited
orders from prospective buyers in Washington.36 Then the
salesmen transmitted the orders to the St. Louis office to be
filled and shipped back to Washington. 7 The Supreme Court
found that the continuous and systematic business activities
of the defendant in Washington, resulted in many interstate
sales, and therefore justified the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion.38 Moreover, the Supreme Court held that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction by a state court satisfies the due process
clause if the defendant had "certain minimum contacts
with... [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice."' 9 This test, formulated by the Supreme Court,
32. Perritt, Jr., supra note 8, at 14. The author also describes the distinc-
tion between personal and real actions, as well as between local and transitory
actions. These distinctions largely disappeared in the personal jurisdiction de-
terminations of today's civil actions.
33. Perritt, Jr., supra note 8, at 15.
34. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see also Per-
ritt, Jr., supra note 8, at 15.
35. International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 313.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 314.
38. Id. at 320.
39. Id. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer. 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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focused on the defendant's past connection with the forum.4
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,"' the Su-
preme Court added an additional requirement-that a defen-
dant should "reasonably anticipate" being hailed into the
chosen court. In World-Wide, the defendant, a car dealer-
ship, sold a car to the plaintiff in New York.42 Later, while
driving in Oklahoma, the plaintiff had an accident where his
car caught fire and caused serious injuries. 3 The plaintiff
filed suit in Oklahoma." The Supreme Court found that the
defendant did not seek or serve the Oklahoma market and
concluded that "those affiliating circumstances that are a
necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdic-
tion," did not exist.4' The Court stated that the foreseeability
of the accident is irrelevant and the test is not "that a prod-
uct may find its way into the forum state," but "that the de-
fendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are
such that he should reasonably anticipate being hailed into
court there."'"
In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 47 a Florida-based
franchiser sued a Michigan individual in Florida for breach of
contract after they entered into a franchise agreement. The
Court evaluated whether the defendant purposefully estab-
lished minimum contacts in the forum state by deciding
whether the defendant could reasonably anticipate or foresee
that any actions he may take in connection with the fran-
chise could lead to litigation in Florida.'" Based on the de-
fendant's negotiation of a long term franchise with a Florida
corporation, the Court found that the defendant "reached out
beyond Michigan. " 4'9  The contract documents emphasized
that operations were conducted and supervised in Florida,
and all notices and payments were to be sent to Florida."0
Consequently, because modern commercial life allows for the
conducting of business and communications across state
40. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
41. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
42. Id. at 288.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 295.
46. Id. at 297.
47. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 468 (1985).
48. Id. at 480.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 478-81.
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lines, the fact that the defendant never entered the forum
state did not defeat jurisdiction. As long as efforts are
"purposefully directed" at the residents of another state, the
absence of physical contacts will not defeat jurisdiction.5'
B. State Long-Arm Statutes
The decision in International Shoe lead to the enactment
of state long-arm statutes that expanded the scope of a
court's jurisdiction as broadly as permissible under the Con-
stitution.52 The Supreme Court, moreover, held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" limits the
power of a state court to exert personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant." Since then, all states have procured
statutes by which jurisdiction may be obtained over nonresi-
dent individuals and corporations who could not otherwise be
sued in the forum state.55 State and federal courts use the fo-
rum state's long-arm statute to determine personal jurisdic-
tion over both out-of-state defendants and foreign defen-
dants.55
The wording of state long-arm statutes differs broadly.
A few states have drafted long-arm statutes that place true
jurisdictional limits on their courts.57 Most other states, in
contrast, have enacted long-arm statutes that extended their
jurisdiction to the outer limits of what is constitutionally
permissible.58 For example, while the New York long-arm
statute expressly enumerates specific causes of action that
would give rise to personal jurisdiction,5 the California stat-
ute merely states that "[a] court of this state may exercise ju-
risdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution
of this state or of the United States."0
51. Id. at 476.
52. Gassman, supra note 8, at 572.
53. See infra note 61.
54. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108 (1987).
55. Gassman, supra note 8, at 572.
56. Surprisingly, some statutes are applicable only to state plaintiffs. See
Gassman, supra note 8, at 572.
57. Counts & Martin, supra note 8, at 1119; see, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 9-
10-91 (Harrison 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 543.19(1)(d)(3) (West 1988);
N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a) (McKinney 1990).
58. Counts & Martin, supra note 8, at 1119.
59. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a) (McKinney 1990).
60. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
[Vol. 38374
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C. Due Process
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs the determi-
nation of personal jurisdiction.6 One reason for the need for
the Due Process Clause is the previously mentioned broad
wording of some of the state's long-arm statutes. Another
reason is the court's overly broad interpretation of those long-
arm statutes that specifically enumerate grounds for juris-
diction. Several jurisdictions, if not most of them, interpret
their individual long-arm statute far beyond the actual
wording of the statute up to the constitutional limit. 2 Not
surprisingly, most courts in intellectual property actions
have not denied personal jurisdiction on the basis of a stat-
ute's wording. 3
Virtually all courts have analyzed the Due Process as-
pect of personal jurisdiction of non-resident defendants under
the often cited "Contacts/Fairness" inquiry.6 First, courts
analyze the pre-litigation connections the defendant has with
the forum state, or whether the defendant has sufficient
"contacts" with the forum state. 5 Then, if there were con-
tacts, the courts analyze whether the exercise of jurisdiction
comports with traditional notions of "fair play and substan-
tial justice."66 This two step inquiry determines that personal
61. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
62. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir.
1996) (holding "[iut is settled Ohio law, moreover, that the 'transacting business'
clause of the [civil procedure] statute was meant to extend to the federal consti-
tutional limits of due process, and as a result Ohio personal jurisdiction cases
require an examination of those limits.").
63. See, e.g., EGR, Inc. v. Stern, No. 94 C 3729, 1995 WL 107153, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 1995). "Under Illinois law, it is well settled that the term tor-
tious act 'inevitably includes that concept of injury, and for purposes of [the
long-arm statute], the situs of the tort is the place where the injury occurs.'"
Milwaukee Concrete Studios v. Fjeld Mfg., Co., 8 F.3d 441, 448 n.14 (7th Cir.
1993) (quoting Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1141
(7th Cir. 1975)). However, "[flor the tort of infringement of an intellectual
property right, the situs of the injury is the state in which the right's owner re-
sides." Fjeld, 8 F.3d at 448.
64. See, e.g., Gassman, supra note 8, at 573; CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,
89 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1996).
65. See, e.g., Gassman, supra note 8, at 572; CompuServe, Inc., 89 F.3d at
1263.
66. Gassman, supra note 8, at 572.
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jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
D. General and Specific Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court, in Helicopteros Nacionales de Co-
lombia S.A. v. Hall,6 7 dissected personal jurisdiction into two
categories: general and specific jurisdiction. If a party is not
domiciled, incorporated, or does not have its principal place
of business within a state, a forum has general jurisdiction
only if the party has substantial and continuing contacts to
that forum.68 General jurisdiction allows a state to exercise
jurisdiction over a party for any claim, even though the
pending cause of action does not arise out of the defendant's
forum-related activities.69
On the contrary, specific jurisdiction is exercised when a
claim arises out of the defendant's contacts with the forum
state.7 ° Succinctly stated, specific jurisdiction exists, when a
court agrees to entertain a cause of action which does arise
from forum-related activities.7' Specific jurisdiction is there-
fore narrower and more circumscribed in applicability than
general jurisdiction in that the underlying cause of action by
the plaintiff must be related to the defendant's contacts in
67. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 410
(1984). Helicopteros involved a wrongful death suit brought in Texas based on
a helicopter crash in Peru. Id. at 412. Neither of the plaintiffs were Texas
residents, nor was the defendant a Colombian corporation. Id. at 411-12. All
parties conceded that the claims did not arise out of the defendant's activities
within Texas and therefore, the court could not exercise specific jurisdiction.
Id. at 415. However, the Supreme Court determined defendant's connections
with Texas were not sufficient to allow a Texas court to assert specific jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 416. The court found that the defendant's contact in Texas, such as
accepting checks drawn on a Texas bank in payment for services, purchasing
helicopters and equipment, and sending employees to Texas for training, did
not constitute doing business in Texas sufficient for general jurisdiction. Id. at
416-17. Thus, the Supreme Court analyzed the defendant's overall business
contacts and concluded that they could not establish general jurisdiction. Heli-
copteros, 466 U.S. at 418-19.
68. BURNHAM, supra note 22, at 261 (distinguishing the Ninth Circuit who
requires for general jurisdiction "substantial" or "continuous and systematic"
activities in the state); see also, McDonough v. McElligott, Inc., No. CIV 95-
4037, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15139, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1996) (citing Data
Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. Ass'ns, 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977)).
69. BURNHAM, supra note 22, at 261.
70. Gassman, supra note 8, at 571.
71. Lyon, supra note 23, at 664 (citing Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d
617, 621 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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the forum state.72 Thus, the standard for the exercise of gen-
eral jurisdiction (continuous and systematic contacts with the
forum state) is in almost any situation, harder to meet.7 3
III. ONLINE COMMUNICATION
Even though it is a creation of the newest technology, the
same traditional principles of personal jurisdiction readily
apply to the new medium of the Internet. Despite all the
concern that the current set of laws would be inadequate to
meet the demands of today's technology, the existing laws re-
garding personal jurisdiction are more than suitable to adapt
to the needs of the Internet in the context of copyright in-
fringement cases.
This article applies the traditional notions of personal
jurisdiction and suggests the following theory: the likelihood
that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised by
the courts is directly proportionate to the nature and quality
of the activity the defendant conducts over the Internet.74 In
other words, the greater the quality of contacts the defendant
has with the forum via the Internet, the greater the likeli-
hood that personal jurisdiction will be found. In order to ap-
ply this theory, the next inquiry focuses on the factors should
courts look at to define the "quality" of contacts.
In addition to the traditional factors, this article sug-
gests that courts should consider the following when evalu-
ating the nature and quality of the contacts the defendant
has with the forum via the Internet when confronted with a
case of copyright infringement.76 First, courts should exam-
ine whether the defendant Internet user had knowledge and
control over where, if, and by whom the "infringing" work
will be retrieved. Second, courts should consider the greater
the likelihood that the physical location of the source of the
infringement can be identified. Third, courts should examine
the level of interaction between the plaintiff and the defen-
dant, the commercial nature of defendant's on-line services
and the amount of illicit information that is accessible to the
plaintiff via the defendant's Internet usage. Following this
72. Lyon, supra note 23, at 664.
73. Compare Counts & Martin, supra note 8, at 1117 n.229.
74. This notion was articulated in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.,
952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997), to support the underlying rationale
for exercising jurisdiction over context of content providers.
75. See supra note 24.
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approach, the higher the level of interaction between the
plaintiff and the defendant, the more illicit information that
is available on-line, the more likely the plaintiff can identify
the physical situs of the "infringing" defendant, and the more
likely the defendant had knowledge and control over who re-
trieved his work, the more likely personal jurisdiction should
be found over the defendant.
To guide courts in the approach outlined above, this arti-
cle examines the case law that exists pertaining to personal
jurisdiction with respect to different Internet technologies.
This article distinguishes the communication methods on the
Internet into three main groups of applications: (1) Web
servers,76 (2) electronic mail communication,77 and (3) the
Usenet.7" The three methods differ as to which party is the
more active one in transmitting data. In order to receive in-
formation stored on a Web server, a user has to access the
server and to select the file he wants to view. Thus, the user
actively initiates the transmission of the information. In con-
trast, a user receives information in the electronic mail com-
76. A Web server is a computer that holds the files for one or more Web
sites. A large Web site may reside on a number of servers located in many dif-
ferent geographic places. For purposes of this Article, "Web server" is used for
all remote retrieval systems and thus also for the bulletin board service. See
<http://whatis.com> (visited Feb. 16, 1998).
A bulletin board service ("BBS") is a computer that can be reached directly
by telephone for the purpose of sharing or exchanging messages or other files.
Many BBS's are devoted to specific interests; others offer a more general serv-
ice. Essentially, a bulletin board service is a host computer that is accessible by
dial-up telephone (one needs to know the telephone number). However, many
BBSs have Web sites. Many Internet access providers have bulletin board
services from which new Internet users can download the necessary software to
get connected. See <http'J/whatis.com> (visited Feb. 16, 1998).
77. Electronic mail ('e-mail") communication combines the applications of
e-mail and mailing lists. E-mail is the exchange of computer-stored messages
by telecommunication. E-mail was one of the first uses of the Internet and is
still probably the most popular single use. E-mail can be distributed over
mailing lists to a large number of people. Some mailing lists allow you to sub-
scribe by sending a request to the mailing list administrator. A mailing list
that is administered automatically is called a list server. See
<http://whatis.com> (visited Feb. 16, 1998).
78. Usenet is a worldwide network of posted discussion groups known as
newsgroups and a set of rules for accessing and posting to them. There are
thousands of newsgroups. A newsgroup can be hosted on servers that are out-
side the Internet and many are. A newsgroup is a posted discussion group on
the Usenet. Newsgroups are organized into subject hierarchies, with the first
few letters of the newsgroup name indicating the major subject category and
sub-categories represented by a subtopic name. See <http://whatis.com>
(visited Feb. 16, 1998).
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munication passively. Instead of the receiver initiating the
transmission, a third person or an automated mailing list
server7 1 forwards the mail and thus, initiates the transmis-
sion. A combination of both methods of communication over
the Internet is the Usenet. A user actively post articles to be
distributed automatically by a Usenet server to another
Usenet server. However, in order to receive an article, a user
has to access the server and to select the file he wants to
view. The following analysis will articulate the importance of
these distinctions as applied to personal jurisdiction.
A. Web Servers
The first group is the Web server. A Web server is a
computer that holds the files for one or more Web sites. A
large Web site may reside on a number of different servers in
a number of different geographic locations.
Most of the Internet personal jurisdiction cases that ex-
ist today deal with this first group-operators or potential
operators of Web servers.0 The subject matter of the major-
ity of these existing cases is the reservation of a domain
name and the focus is mainly on the person responsible for
the content of a Web site in the context of trademark in-
fringement and libel. Although the cases are not directly on
point, they do provide some insight into the personal jurisdic-
tion analysis of persons charged with copyright infringement.
The following gives three examples of when a copyright
infringement would arise in conjunction with a Web Server.
First, if a user accesses an infringing work that is stored on
an out-of-state Web Server and downloads the file into his
computer, a copyright infringement occurs at the user's loca-
tion.8' A second scenario is if a domestic user uploads an in-
fringing work to an out-of-state server, a copyright infringe-
ment occurs at the forwarding user's computer as well.
These two situations identify several potential out-of-state
79. Mailing lists have become a popular way for Internet users to keep up
with topics of interest to them. On the Internet, mailing lists include each per-
son's e-mail address. The program is called "listserv" and the computer that
operates the mailing list is the mailing list server. See <http://whatis.com>
(visited Feb. 16, 1998).
80. See, e.g., Inset Sys., Inc., v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D.
Conn. 1996).
81. See, e.g., Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Maphia, 984 F. Supp. 923, 938-39 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (explaining that infringement occurs either by downloading or, ar-
guably, by browsing).
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defendants. The first potential defendant is an out-of-state
(or a foreign) content provider, who operates the server. The
second potential defendant is an out-of-state user, not the
operator of the server, but a user, who uploaded the infring-
ing material. Finally, a third potential defendant is an out-
of-state service provider, who connected to an out-of-state
server containing illicit material or an out-of-state individual
user who uploaded the material to the Internet. A court
must individually analyze whether personal jurisdiction can
be obtained over each of these defendants. This article will
address an analysis for each of these three potential defen-
dants.
As a general overview, this article argues that the
greater the nature and quality of the contacts the defendant
has to the forum state, the more likely a court will find per-
sonal jurisdiction. Specifically, as to out-of state content pro-
viders, it is unlikely that courts will find general jurisdiction
over an out-of-state defendant, except in the rare case where
a business operates exclusively over the Internet. Therefore,
courts focus on specific jurisdiction; if a contractual contact
exists or the defendant is clearly doing business with the fo-
rum state, then a court will almost never deny personal ju-
risdiction. The rule when a defendant commits a tortious act
is not as clear and a finding of jurisdiction seems to be very
fact specific. As to out-of-state service providers, as well as
out-of-state uploaders," it is unlikely that courts will find
personal jurisdiction over these defendants.
1. Out-of-State Content Provider
Content providers are the most attractive defendants in
Internet cases. Content providers control the server's mate-
rial, make the material available to users, and typically have
"deep pockets," in contrast to an individual user who merely
downloaded or browsed through illicit material. So typically,
neither copyright owners, nor the performing rights organi-
zations (such as ASCAP or BMI),83 would focus on pursuing
82. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
83. ASCAP is the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers,
an organization of over 68,000 composers, lyricists, and music publishers. BMI
is a music performing rights organization representing more than 100,000
songwriters and composers and 50,000 music publishers with a repertoire of
over 2,500,000 works. See <http'/whatis.com> (visited Feb. 16, 1998).
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individual users for infringement by downloading copy-
righted works. Instead, content providers would be the focus
of the infringement dispute. Not surprisingly, until now, al-
most every court that has addressed personal jurisdiction is-
sues with regard to on-line activities has analyzed the con-
tent provider.8'
a. General Jurisdiction
General jurisdiction requires that a defendant be domi-
ciled, incorporated, have its principal place of business, or
have substantial and consistent contacts with the forum.8"
General jurisdiction allows a state to exercise jurisdiction
over a party for any claim, even though the pending cause of
action does not arise out of the defendant's forum-related ac-
tivities.86 In general, the cases indicate that the mere exis-
tence of a defendant's Internet presence in the forum state
should not be sufficient to find personal jurisdiction over that
defendant.
The first commentators to address these new personal
jurisdiction issues found the existence of a Web site in itself
sufficient to obtain general jurisdiction over the content pro-
vider.87 They stated that "where an injured party 'surfs' the
Internet and finds harm-causing information, it appears that
a civil action could lie in any jurisdiction where the informa-
tion can be retrieved"88 and "[i]n the long run, effective judi-
cial pursuit of the international on-line [copyright] piracy
may require that infringers be amenable to suit in every
country in which the infringement is capable of being re-
ceived (i.e., throughout the world), and that the entire,
worldwide claim be actionable in any country." 9
After the Internet confronted the courts with broad sub-
stantive intellectual property issues, the confusion about pro-
cedural questions of jurisdiction began with United States v.
Thomas ° in January 1996. The Sixth Circuit discussed a
84. See, e.g., Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 297
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
85. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
86. BURNHAM, supra note 22, at 261.
87. See, e.g., infra notes 88-89.
88. Marchant, supra note 7, at 491.
89. Jane C. Ginsburg, Global Use/Territorial Rights: Private International
Law Questions of the Global Information Infrastructure, 42 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 318, 322 (1995).
90. 74 F.3d 701, 709 (6th.Cir. 1996). See Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Di-
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California defendant's challenge of venue in the Western Dis-
trict of Tennessee based on the defendant's convictions and
sentences for violating federal obscenity laws.9 After Tho-
mas, several district courts issued conflicting and inconsis-
tent decisions regarding personal jurisdiction based on Inter-
net activities. Some district courts still favor the worldwide
personal jurisdiction approach, while other courts tried to
structure and narrow their personal jurisdiction analysis.
The District Court of Connecticut, in Inset v. Instruc-
tion," asserted personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state de-
fendant based merely on the existence of an Internet web site
and an "800" telephone number, both of which only adver-
tised defendant's services." The plaintiff owned a federal
trademark registration for "INSET" and discovered the use of
its mark when it tried to obtain the domain name
"INSET.COM" by the defendant Instruction Set Inc., a Mas-
sachusetts-based provider of computer technology. '  Al-
though, the court discussed the long-arm statute, it remains
unclear if the court determined personal jurisdiction to be
general or specific jurisdiction." It appears that the court
found general personal jurisdiction over the defendant since
the court ignored a statutory element which is typical for a
specific personal jurisdiction analysis, namely, if the cause of
action arose out of the activities.96
The court compared the defendant's Internet advertise-
ments about future services to "catalogs advertised in peri-
odicals having Connecticut circulation" and noted that "once
posted on the Internet, unlike television and radio advertis-
rect Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), and Plus Sys., Inc.
v. New England Network, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 111 (D. Col. 1992) for decisions
dealing with contractual relationships permitting the use of databases.
91. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 709.
92. Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D.Conn. 1996).
93. Id. at 162.
94. Id. at 163.
95. Id. at 163-64.
96. Compare the three-part test of the Ninth Circuit for specific jurisdiction
in Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 1993), with regard to the
"arising out" element. The confusion in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set,
Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996), resulted out of the citation of the Con-
necticut long-arm statute, CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 33-411(c)(2) (repealed Jan. 1,
1997), which provided that "[elvery foreign corporation shall be subject to suit
in this state ... on any cause of action arising ... (2) out of any business solic-
ited in this state ... if the corporation has repeatedly so solicited," but is miss-
ing any discussion of the elements. Inset Sys., Inc., 937 F. Supp. at 163.
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ing, the advertisement is available continuously to any In-
ternet user."97 The court found this continuous advertising a
solicitation of a "sufficient repetitive nature."" The court
stated that the defendant directed its advertising to all states
within the United States, therefore, finding it "purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of doing business within Con-
necticut."99 Then the court addressed the constitutional due
process factor, and found minimum contacts, since "the dis-
tance between Connecticut and Massachusetts [is] minimal,"
as it is only a two hour travel time."°
Although the court in Inset found general jurisdiction
over the defendant merely based on the existence of a Web
site, this holding is not representative of the majority of the
case law. Typically, this minimal presence is not enough to
justify general jurisdiction. This is the holding in the vast
majority of the case law, starting with McDonough v. Fallon
McElligott.0 The court in McDonough expressly refused to
exercise general jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant
solely on the basis of its maintenance of a web site."2 The
alleged copyright infringement was the use of a photo in sev-
eral national publications, but not on defendant's web site."3
The court held, "[b]ecause the web enables easy world-wide
access, allowing computer interaction via the Web to supply
sufficient contacts to establish jurisdiction would eviscerate
the personal jurisdiction requirement as it currently exists;
the Court is not willing to take this step."" The court there-
fore stated "[t]hus, the fact that [the defendant] has a Web
site used by Californians cannot establish [general] jurisdic-
tion by itself."'9
Based on McDonough, the District Court for the Central
District of California denied general jurisdiction in two sub-
sequent decisions.' In Naxos v. Southam,' the court stated
97. Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn.
1996).
98. Id. at 161.
99. Id. at 165.
100. Id.
101. McDonough v. McElligott, Inc., No. CIV 95-4037, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15139, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1996).
102. Id. at *11.
103. Id. at *2.
104. Id. at *7.
105. Id.
106. Naxos Resources Ltd. v. Southam Inc., No. CIV 96-2314, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21759, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 1996); Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen,
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that neither the existence of a Web site, nor the publication
of an allegedly defamatory newspaper article on the legal
computer on-line services LEXIS and WESTLAW conferred
general jurisdiction, but might be relevant for a specific ju-
risdiction analysis. In Panavision v. Toeppen, °8 a domain
name dispute, the court did not even address the impact of a
Web site on a general jurisdiction analysis.
In Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger,9 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York broadly ad-
dressed personal jurisdiction over a Web site operator who
allegedly infringed on plaintiffs intellectual property rights.
Like the majority of disputes over personal jurisdiction, the
case involves a domain name dispute. Hearst Corporation,
owner and publisher of "ESQUIRE Magazine," brought a
trademark infringement action against the defendant, who
operates a Web site under the domain name "esqwire.com. " H°
It should be noted that the court considered defendant's do-
main registration as legitimate as compared to a mere
"cybersquatter,""' one who attempts to profit from the Inter-
net by reserving and later reselling or licensing domain
names." 2  The court distinguished Panavision v. Toeppen
where defendant was a cybersquatter."3 Moreover, the court
stated that a WESTLAW search revealed more than 1,100
incorporated businesses using the mark "Esq" or "Esquire." 14
The Hearst court briefly examined New York's jurisdic-
tional statute, section 301 of New York's Civil Practice Law
and Rules, and stated this section traditionally applies only
to persons actually present in New York, or to corporations
"doing business" in this state."5  However, the court never
938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
107. Naxos Resources Ltd., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21759, at *1, *8.
108. Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 620 (C.D. Cal.
1996).
109. Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. CIV 96-3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
110. Id. at *2. Hearst Corporation has published the magazine Esquire since
1933 and owns the trademark registration for the mark "Esquire" for such
goods. Id. at *9.
111. Id. at *17.
112. Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
113. Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996). See
infra note 198 (defining "cybersquatter").
114. Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. CIV 96-3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *15
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
115. JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, PRACTICE COMMENTARY TO CPLR 7-8 (1990).
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decided the question of whether "doing business" applies to
an individual person because it found the plaintiff had
waived all general jurisdiction arguments, therefore circum-
scribing an analysis of section 301.116
Nevertheless, the Hearst court expressed that even if the
plaintiff had not waived the section 301 argument, and even
if New York would have applied the statute to an individual,
general jurisdiction would still be lacking."1  It stated that
there is some truth in the Maritz court's argument that
"while modern technology has made nationwide commercial
transactions simpler and more feasible.., it must broaden
correspondingly the permissible scope of jurisdiction exercis-
able by the courts.""8 However, the court disagreed with the
finding of personal jurisdiction in Maritz by stating that al-
lowing jurisdiction, based merely on an Internet Web site,
"would be tantamount to a declaration that this Court, and
every other court throughout the world, may assert
[personal] jurisdiction over all information providers on the
global World Wide Web. Such a holding would have a devas-
tating impact on those who use this global service." 9
This article suggests that general jurisdiction should not
be found merely based on a defendant's Internet presence in
the forum state. At this time, three courts expressly denied
general jurisdiction based on the maintenance of a web site.'
They found that the establishment of general jurisdiction
through a Web site, would make operators vulnerable to law-
suits everywhere even for unrelated activities. This would
eviscerate the personal jurisdiction requirement as it cur-
116. Hearst Corp., 1997 WL 97097, at *8.
117. Id. (stating that the contacts do not establish jurisdiction under section
302, nor could they be sufficient under section 301).
118. Id. at *20. (citing Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328,
1334 (E.D. Mo.1996) (quoting California Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research,
Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356, 1363 (C.D. Cal. 1986))).
119. Hearst Corp., 1997 WL 97097, at *20. The Hearst court summarized
the rationale of the decisions in Maritz as follows: "through their web sites, de-
fendants consciously decided to transmit advertising information to all Internet
users, including those in the forum state, thereby (allegedly) committing
trademark infringement in the forum state and purposefully availing them-
selves of the privilege of doing business within the forum state." Id.
120. See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. CIV 96-3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997). See also McDonough v. McElligott, Inc., No. CIV 95-
4037, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15139, at *1 (S.D. Cal Aug. 6, 1996); Naxos Resources
Ltd. v. Southam Inc., No. CIV 96-2314, 1996 WL 635387, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June
3, 1996).
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rently exists. 2' The existence of a web site that contains a
copyrighted work, even an advertisement, will most likely
not constitute general jurisdiction. This finding is consistent
with the theory of the article that personal jurisdiction is
proportionate to the nature and quality of defendant's con-
tacts to the forum state. Clearly, the mere existence of a
Web site is not a pervasive presence sufficient enough to
amount to a "quality" contact.
A potential scenario could exist where merely a Web site
may be sufficient to justify a finding of general jurisdiction.
It is possible that a business could operate exclusively over
the Internet (such as a search engine),'22 and that defendant's
site could provide contractual services, extending into the
realm of an interactive service. 2 ' In this scenario, the courts
might be justified in a finding of general jurisdiction.
b. Specific Jurisdiction
Specific jurisdiction is exercised when a claim arises out
of the defendant's contacts with the forum state."' In other
words, specific jurisdiction exists when a court agrees to en-
tertain a cause of action which arises from forum-related ac-
tivities.' Specific jurisdiction requires that the plaintiffs
underlying cause of action be related to the defendant's con-
tacts in the forum state. 26 In general, the cases indicate that
if a contractual relationship exists with the forum state, a
court will almost never deny a finding of personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. Also if the defendant is found to be doing
business with the forum state, typically courts will find per-
sonal jurisdiction. When personal jurisdiction is dependent
on the defendant's commission of a tortious act within the fo-
rum, there does not appear to be a general trend. The courts
look to the specific facts of each case to determine whether
121. McDonough, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15139, at *6; Naxos Resources Ltd., 1996
WL 635387, at *2.
122. A search engine is a "robot" or "crawler" that goes to every page or rep-
resentative pages on the Web and creates a huge index. Then, it is a program
that receives a user's search request, compares it to the entries in the index,
and returns the results to the user. See <http//whatis.com> (visited Feb. 16,
1998).
123. Bender, supra note 8, at 32.
124. Gassman, supra note 8, at 571.
125. Lyon, supra note 23, at 664 (citing Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d
617, 620 (9th Cir. 1991)).
126. Id.
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personal jurisdiction is proper.127
i. Specific Jurisdiction Based on Contractual
Contacts
It is widely accepted that the existence of a contract
alone is not sufficient to obtain personal jurisdiction. How-
ever, almost every court that has addressed personal juris-
diction over out-of-state content providers has held that if the
defendants had contractual relationships with plaintiffs or
with state residents, personal jurisdiction would be found
over the defendants."8 Currently, the decisions addressing
specific jurisdiction based on contractual contacts exist only
in the context of trademark infringement and defamation.
Although the circumstances and the substantive legal con-
siderations of trademark infringement and defamation are
not identical to copyright infringement actions, the proce-
dural issues are equivalent.
For example, in CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson,'29 the
Sixth Circuit found personal jurisdiction proper in Ohio over
an Texas Internet user who subscribed to plaintiff's network
service based in Ohio. 30 However, not only did the defendant
subscribe to CompuServe, but unlike most users, he entered
into a separate written agreement with the service to sell his
software over the Internet.' The defendant advertised, sent
127. Gassman, supra note 8, at 572 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)).
128. The court in Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So.
2d 1351 (D. App. Fla. 1994), decided a different situation. The split panel of the
intermediate Florida court held that Florida courts lacked personal jurisdiction
over the user of a database located in Miami. Id. However, the decision offers
little analysis as to why personal jurisdiction should not have existed. In Plus
System, Inc. v. New England Network, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 111 (D. Col. 1992), a
Colorado-based ATM network sued its New England affiliate for refusing to
implement a new royalty charge. Id. The district court found that the defen-
dant's regular use of the plaintiffs computer system located in Colorado was a
purposeful availment of Colorado and its law, and found personal jurisdiction
over defendant. Id. at 118. However, there were other contacts, including a
visit and tour of the Colorado computer facility by defendant's personnel, and a
contractual choice of law clause that pointed to Colorado. Id. at 118-19; see also
Perritt, Jr., supra note 8, at 24.
129. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
130. Id. The impact of this case is questionable since Patterson neither filed
an appellate brief nor appeared at oral arguments. This is typically not a con-
vincing defense.
131. In CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1261 (6th Cir. 1996),
the court stated, "flinally... we need not and do not hold that CompuServe
may, as the district court posited, sue any subscriber to its service for nonpay-
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and stored the software on plaintiffs server in Ohio.132 This
case differs from others, because the defendant stored his
content on plaintiffs server. Thus, the court based the per-
sonal jurisdiction analysis not on the content of defendant's
server, but on the "contractual" relationship between the par-
ties.
The court stated that the Ohio long-arm statute was
meant to extend to the fullest limit of the Constitution.3
The court analyzed the defendant's specific jurisdiction under
the commonly used three-part test: (1) a nonresident defen-
dant must have purposefully availed himself of the privilege
of conducting activities in the forum by some affirmative act
or conduct, (2) plaintiffs claim must arise out of or result
from the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. 6
The court found the "purposeful availment" requirement
satisfied because the defendant purposefully contracted with
the plaintiff to market a product outside of his home state.13
Therefore, CompuServe "operat[ed] in effect, as his distribu-
tion center.""3 7 The Sixth Circuit specifically did "not hold
that Patterson would be subject to suit in any state where his
software was purchased or used," but found that this rela-
tionship was intended to be ongoing.33 The court found that
the cause of action arose from his Ohio activities and that
personal jurisdiction was reasonable under such circum-
stances, where, in effect, all of his sales and proceeds flowed
through the forum state.3 9  More significantly, the court
clearly placed importance on the fact that the contractual
agreements between the parties specifically stated that the
parties would be subject to Ohio law.' °
ment in Ohio, even if the subscriber is a native Alaskan who has never left
home." Id. at 1268.
132. Id. at 1261.
133. Id. at 1263-64.
134. Id. at 1262.
135. Id. (citing Reynolds v. International Amateur Athlete Fed'n, 23 F.3d
1110, 1116 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting In Flight Devices v. Van Dusen Air, Inc.,
466 F.2d 220, 226 (6th Cir. 1972))).
136. Id.
137. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1996).
138. Id. at 1265.
139. Id. at 1266-69.
140. Peter Brown, US Courts Use Internet to Assert Jurisdiction over Foreign
Defendants; Jurisdiction Can Be Based on Acts in Cyberspace, But Which Acts?,
(April 11, 1997) <http://www.ljx.com/internet/p6courts.html>.
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The next decision that found personal jurisdiction in the
context of contractual on-line activities was Edias v. Basis.4
This case did not involve an intellectual property infringe-
ment, but defamation. The court analyzed the defendant's
"purposeful availment" under the Supreme Court's "effect
test" and examined the contacts between the parties, in-
cluding a long term business relationship, as well as the de-
famatory statements as grounds for jurisdiction.' According
to the "effect test," jurisdiction is found for tortious acts
caused by the nonresident, if intentional actions are ex-
pressly aimed at the forum state and cause foreseeable harm
to the defendant.43 The court found a purposeful availment
by the defendant to the forum state based on the defamatory
statements and the long term business relationship between
the parties, individually sufficient for a finding of jurisdic-
tion.'"
The alleged defamatory statements identified the plain-
tiff and were transmitted to business partners via e-mail, a
Web site, as well as a CompuServe forum. "5 Thus, according
to the court, they were directed and expressly aimed at the
forum state. "6 It also stated that modern technology made
this nationwide transaction simpler.' Correspondingly, the
court stated that this technology must broaden the permissi-
ble scope of forums. "8 Moreover, a defendant should not be
able to take advantage of the Internet and simultaneously
escape traditional notions of jurisdiction. " ' Similar to the
Panavision court, the court in this case stated that a pre-
sumption of reasonableness exists and the defendant did not
allege any sovereignty issues.5
In Digital v. Altavista Technology, 5' the court exercised
141. EDIAS Software Intl, L.L.C. v. BASIS Int'l, Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 422
(D. Ariz. 1996).
142. Id. at 420.
143. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
144. EDIAS Software Intl L.L.C. v. BASIS Intl, Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413 (D.
Ariz. 1996).
145. Id. at 415.
146. Id. at 420.
147. Id. (citing California Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, 631 F. Supp.
1356, 1363 (C.D. Cal. 1986)).
148. Id. (citing California Software, Inc., 631 F. Supp. at 1363).
149. Id. at 420.
150. EDIAS Software Intl L.L.C. v. BASIS Intl Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 421
(D. Ariz. 1996).
151. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass.
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personal jurisdiction in a trademark infringement action.5 2
Although it seemed the court would address the Internet ac-
tivities of the defendant by entitling a portion of its opinion
"Personal Jurisdiction And The Internet," instead the per-
sonal jurisdiction analysis was based on the parties contrac-
tual relationship.' Plaintiff paid for an assignment of de-
fendant's right to the trademark "AltaVista," then
immediately licensed-back to the defendant the right to use
the mark as part of its corporate name, as well as part of its
domain name.' Both parties used the Internet for their
services. Plaintiff operated one of the leading "search en-
gines" 5' known as "AltaVista" and sold various software over
the Internet.'56 The defendant offered some comparable
products and a confusingly similar "search engine."'57 It
seems that the court was not sure if the alleged breach of a
licensing agreement itself would be sufficient to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction. Obviously intending to find personal ju-
risdiction, the court stated "[i]n short, Digital's suit "arises
from" an alleged breach of a contract with a Massachusetts
corporation, and ATI's [the defendant] resulting Internet ac-
tivities, including sales and advertising to Massachusetts
residents taken together constitute transacting business
here.""8 In finding personal jurisdiction, the court went too
far. The personal jurisdiction analysis should have focused
only on the licensing agreement and the court should have
refrained from deciding "Personal Jurisdiction And The In-
ternet."
The court in Playboy v. Chuckleberry'59 focused on a
"contractual relationship" between the domestic Internet
user and the defendant, an Italian content provider in as-
sessing personal jurisdiction. In this case, a contractual rela-
tionship between the parties did not exist. The decision in-
1997).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 462-63.
154. Id. at 459.
155. See supra note 122 (defining search engine).
156. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 459 (D.
Mass. 1997).
157. Id. at 461 (stating defendant's web site was "designed to look, feel, and
function very much like Digital's AltaVista Web-site").
158. Id. at 465.
159. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032,
1035-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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volved a contempt proceeding against an Italian defendant
for violation of a 1981 judgment enjoining it from publishing
or distributing in the United States its "Playmen" maga-
zine. 6' The server was an Italian company and the sever was
located in Italy, yet the court did not address personal juris-
diction. Although not expressly mentioned in the case, it is
likely that the court found that it retained jurisdiction over
Defendant for the purposes of enforcing the 1981 injunction.
On the merits, the Court found that the defendant had
violated the injunction."' One of the defendant's sites was a
"pay site" meaning to access the site, the customer had to af-
firmatively subscribe to the service and pay the defendant.'62
The defendant knew that people in the United States were
accessing its site, because he sent customers a "password"
allowing access to the site via defendant violated the injunc-
tion.'63 Although the court did not decide the copyright issue,
it stated that it was highly important that the defendant has
offered pictorial images with sexual content on an Italian
server and thus "has distributed its product within the
United States.""
In Zippo v. Zippo Dot Corn,6 5 a case involving a domain
name dispute, the court found personal jurisdiction over the
defendant based on the contacts of third parties with the de-
fendant.'66 Plaintiff, the manufacturer of "ZIPPO" lighters
and the owner of the same mark, sued the defendant an op-
erator of an Internet service for trademark infringement."
67
In order to use the defendant's service, a subscriber must
submit his e-mail and his mailing address to receive a pass-
word from the defendant that allows access to the defen-
dant's server.16 Approximately two percent (3,000) of defen-
dant's subscribers, were Pennsylvania residents. 169  While
access to the first level of defendant's server was free of
charge, the two other levels offered by the defendant did re-
160. Id. at 1035.
161. Id. at 1038-40.
162. Id. at 1035.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1043.
165. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.
1997). The defendant used e.g. the domains "zippo.com," "zippo.net," and
"zipponews.com" for his newsgroup service. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1121.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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quire a financial payment.7 '
Thus, a contractual relationship between the defendant
and third parties did exist. Nevertheless, the court held that
this case was "not an Internet advertising case" and "not
even an interactivity case in the line of Maritz" but, was "a
doing business over the Internet case in the line of CompuS-
erve."17' It further stated that the contracts were not
"fortuitous" because the defendant consciously and repeat-
edly chose to process Pennsylvania residents' applications
and assign passwords. 72  Finally, the court concluded that
the cause of action arose out of defendant's forum related
conduct since "a significant amount of the alleged infringe-
ment and dilution, and resulting injury had occurred in
Pennsylvania."73
In summary, the cases demonstrate that when there ex-
ist contractual contacts with the forum state, personal juris-
diction is uniformly found. If a content provider makes copy-
righted works available to (contractual) subscribers, he will
be subject to personal jurisdiction in places where a signifi-
cant number of subscribers reside."' This finding is consis-
tent with the theory of this article that personal jurisdiction
is proportionate to the nature and quality of defendant's con-
tacts to the forum state. A contractual relationship is clearly
a "quality" contact with the forum justifying personal juris-
diction. One reason why a contractual relationship is a
quality contact is because the defendant, a content provider,
has knowledge and control over the information provided to
the contractual subscribers. The defendant knows who the
subscribers are and also knows the residence of the subscrib-
ers because of their contractual relationship. Typically the
defendant derives revenue from those subscriptions and is
more likely to keep current information about the subscrib-
ers. A contractual relationship with the forum state is a suf-
ficient enough presence to constitute a "quality" contact.
170. Id. at 1121.
171. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (W.D.
Pa. 1997).
172. Id. at 1126.
173. Id. at 1127.
174. See Perritt, Jr., supra note 8, at 19. The author used CompuServe and
America Online as examples for subscription-based commercial systems. Id.
However, a content provider that charges for the use of a remote server has
subscribers and a contractual relationship as well. Id.
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ii. Specific Jurisdiction Based on Non-Contractual
Contacts: Doing Business and the Commission
of a Tortious Act
Since most specific long-arm statutes provide that courts
may exercise jurisdiction over defendants who are either
"doing business" within the state or "committing [a] tortious
act," most courts have analyzed defendant's activities with
regard to these two alternatives. The majority of the courts
to address personal jurisdiction over out-of-state content pro-
viders have held that if the defendant is doing business with
the forum state, the court has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. When personal jurisdiction is dependent on the
defendant's commission of a tortious act within the forum,
there does not appear to be a general trend toward a finding
of personal jurisdiction. The courts look to the specific facts
of each case to determine whether personal jurisdiction is
proper. These cases, like the contractual decisions analyzed
above, are actions for infringement and defamation.
In Minnesota v. Granite Gates Resorts,7 ' the court found
personal jurisdiction over the defendant because his activity
amounted to doing business in the forum state. The court
found personal jurisdiction based on the contacts of third
parties with the defendant.176 The court upheld jurisdiction
in an action by the State Attorney General to enjoin defen-
dant's gambling web site under the state's gambling and con-
sumer protection laws.'77 The evidence showed that the web
175. Minnesota v. Granite Gates Resorts, Inc., CIV No. 95-7227, 1996 WL
767431, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996), affd 568 N.W. 2d 715 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997), cert. granted, No. 97-89, 1997 Minn. LEXIS 1997 (Minn. Oct. 31,
1997).
176. Id. The Minnesota Attorney General's Office released a memorandum
on the Internet, asserting that Minnesota courts have jurisdiction over persons
outside the state who transmit information on-line that will be disseminated
within. Id. The Office fied six lawsuits against promoters of illegal activities
on the Internet such as gambling, credit repair, pyramid schemes and snake
oil. Id.
177. Id. at *4. Section 609.025 of the Minnesota General Criminal Jurisdic-
tion Statute, reads as follows:
A person may be convicted and sentenced under the law of this State if
the person:
(1) Commits an offense in whole or in part within this state; or
(2) Being without the state, causes, aids or abets another to commit a
crime within the state; or
(3) Being without the state, intentionally causes a result within the
state prohibited by the criminal laws of this state.
MINN. STAT. § 609.025 (1994).
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site advertised to offer a sports bookmaking service via the
Internet which permitted individuals to place bets using a
credit card and that Minnesota residents accessed defen-
dant's web site to place such bets.178
The court used a multi-factor test to find defendant's
purposeful availment.78 The court stated the defendant's
"activity certainly arises to the type of promotional activity or
active solicitation to provide the minimum contacts necessary
for exercising personal jurisdiction."18 This statement illus-
trates that the court considered the activity a transaction of
business rather than a tortious act. The court also rejected
defendant's argument that they never mailed, sent, or adver-
tised in Minnesota, by stating "[t]his argument is not sound
in the age of cyberspace" and found the existence of defen-
dant's web site a direct marketing campaign to the State of
Minnesota."' However, the court expressly stated that Min-
nesota's interest in consumer protection requires jurisdiction
and that it does "not view the contacts the same as what is
necessary for a private litigant to pursue a case."'82 Since the
court's decision is influenced heavily by "Minnesota's interest
in a governmental action," it is of little value for private
copyright infringement actions.
In Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation8 ' the defendant, a
charity, placed an ad seeking donations in the Washington
Post and also had an Internet web site that was nationally
accessible.' The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia found in the claim for trademark infringe-
ment that defendant was "transacting business" and "causing
tortious injury" in the forum.'85 The Heroes court, in review-
ing defendant's activities, held that because of defendant's
newspaper ad, it need not decide if the Internet web site
alone would support jurisdiction."6 However, the opinion left
little doubt that the web site alone would have supported ju-
178. Minnesota v. Granite Gates Resorts, Inc., CIV No. 95-7227, 1996 WL
767431, at *2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996).
179. Id. at *6.
180. Id. at *10.
181. Id. at *6.
182. Id. at *9-*11.
183. Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
184. Id. at 3.
185. Id. at 1.
186. Id. at 5.
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risdiction.'87
In Maritz v. Cybergold, 188 the court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Missouri cited Inset approvingly in asserting personal
jurisdiction over a California corporation that set up a Web
site under the allegedly infringing domain name
"cybergold.com." The Web site had, in fact, been accessed
131 times by Missouri users and was set up with the intent
of soliciting Internet users, including those in Missouri, to
sign up on Cybergold's mailing list.9 The defendant's forth-
coming mailing list was a new business concept which al-
lowed subscribers to receive advertisements via e-mail that
matched their selected interests.9 °
The court decided to analyze whether defendant's activi-
ties satisfy the "commission of a tortious act within this
state" provision in Missouri's long-arm statute rather than
"the transaction of any business test."9' Although the stat-
ute requires an act "within this state," the court ignored this
wording when it stated that even if the activities were wholly
outside of the state, the statute reaches the defendant be-
cause the allegedly infringing activities have produced an
"effect" in the state.'92 The "magic effect test" allows the
court to adjudicate over the whole content of the Internet, be-
cause everything could potentially have some effect on Mis-
souri. The court then analyzed the "minimum contacts" test
under the five-factor test of the Eighth Circuit.9 3 With re-
gard to the nature and quality of the contacts with the forum
state, the first factor, the court found the activity of main-
taining a web site not completely "passive;" rather, it consid-
ered this as a solicitation.' The transmission of information
131 times into the state, constituted a purposeful availment
of the privilege of doing business in Missouri, and as such
Cybergold ought to have reasonably anticipated being sued
there. '9 The court found other factors in favor of obtaining
187. Id.
188. Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1328-30 (E.D. Mo.
1996).
189. Id. at 1330.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1331 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 506.500).
192. Id. at 1331-32.
193. Id. at 1332 (citing Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F3d 816,
819 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Land-O-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 708
F.2d 1338, 1340 (8th Cir. 1983)).
194. Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
195. Id. at 1334.
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jurisdiction and denied any due process or venue objections.'96
In Panavision v. Toeppen,'97 the Central District Court of
California has asserted personal jurisdiction over an already
famous "cybersquatter" living in Illinois, who demanded
$13,000 for the domain name "panavision.com."'98 The court
analyzed specific personal jurisdiction under the Ninth Cir-
cuit's commonly used three-part test.9 The court focused on
the "purposeful availment" factor and stated that the test dif-
fers depending upon the underlying cause of action 0  Fo-
cusing on the defendant's intention to sell the domain name,
the court found his underlying action to be a tort, rather than
a contractual dispute.2 ' Since it was a tort, the court applied
the "effect test" doctrine to analyze the purposeful availment
factor.0 2 Thus, the court did not hold that Toeppen was
"doing business" in California via the Internet."3 Rather, it
held that because of the defendant's intent to interfere with
plaintiff's business, he had "expressly aimed his conduct at
California" where defendant's principal place of business was
located."° The court also held for the defendant as to the two
other factors. First, the court stated that the action arises
out of or results from defendant's forum-related activities,
and second, that the jurisdiction is presumed reasonable, if a
nonresident, acting outside the state, intentionally causes
injury within the state.0 5 Therefore, personal jurisdiction
was found in favor of the defendant.
The court in McDonough v. McElligott °5 refused to exer-
196. Id.
197. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 617 (C.D. Cal.
1996).
198. See Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1227-28 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (defining cybersquatters as "individuals [that] attempt to profit from the
Internet by reserving and later reselling or licensing domain names back to the
companies that spent millions of dollars developing the goodwill of the trade-
mark.").
199. Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 620-23 (C.D. Cal.
1996).
200. Id. at 620-21.
201. Id. at 621.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 622.
204. Id.
205. Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 622 (C.D. Cal.
1996).
206. McDonough v. McEUigott, Inc., No. CIV 95-4037, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15139, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1996).
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cise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. How-
ever, the court did not analyze on-line activities to find the
defendant's "purposeful availment," but instead focused more
on the nationwide distribution of a magazine.2"7 Thus, the
case is less predicative of specific jurisdiction.
After the court in Naxos v. Southam.°8 denied general ju-
risdiction based on the existence of a web site, the court an-
nexed specific jurisdiction regarding an allegedly defamatory
article in the Vancouver Sun (a Canadian newspaper).2"9 The
newspaper article was not available on defendant's web site,
but on the server of the legal computer on-line services
LEXIS and WESTLAW.21° However, the court found even
this minimal publication sufficient for the purposeful avail-
ment test. 1' This is surprising because LEXIS/NEXIS and
WESTLAW have newspapers, periodicals, and information
from almost any country in the world. Arguably, subscribers
do not read foreign newspapers for defamatory statements at
a hourly rate of almost $200. Nevertheless, the court denied
personal jurisdiction because the forum state was not "the fo-
cal point both of the story and of the harm suffered."2" The
loose purposeful availment analysis and the denial of the
"effect" test based on the focus of the Canadian entity is not
very predicative as well.
The United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York in Bensusan Restaurant v. King213 was the
first court that focused its specific jurisdiction analysis on de-
fendant's maintenance of an Internet Web site accessible by
users in New York. 14 The owner of the famous New York
jazz club (and of the federally registered trademark) "The
Blue Note" sued King, owner of a small Missouri jazz club
207. Id. at *15.
208. Naxos Resources Ltd. v. Southam Inc., No. CIV 96-2314, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21759, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 1996).
209. Id. at *6-*7.
210. Id. at *2.
211. Id. at *9.
212. Id. at *9 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984)). To analyze,
if the claim "arises from defendant's forum-related activities" the Calder court
adopted the "effect test" of defamation cases. Id. at *9 (citing Edwards v. Pulit-
zer Publ'g, Co., 716 F. Supp. 438, 441 (N.D. Cal. 1989). The court found that
the Canadian newspaper article addressed Naxos (Canada), rather than Naxos
California. Id. at *10-*11.
213. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
214. Id. at 299-301.
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with the same name, over his Internet web site."'s The web
site included "a fanciful similar logo which [was] substan-
tially similar to the logo utilized" by the plaintiff, a dis-
claimer, and a hypertext link to plaintiffs club.216
Judge Stein analyzed the defendant's activities under
the provisions of New York's long-arm statute. 7 New York's
statute permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents only
on an enumerated basis, and does not extend personal juris-
diction to the full extent of constitutional limits. 2 8 The court
did not analyze the transaction of business within New York
provision pursuant to section 302(a)(1) of the Civil Practice
Law and Rules, but instead did so under section 302(a)(2)
and section 302(a)(3)(ii).21
9
Section 302(a)(2) of New York's Civil Practice Law and
215. Id. at 297-98.
216. Id. at 297. Thus, it was clearly not considered a "cybersquatter" case.
217. Section 302 of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules provides:
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. As to a cause of action
arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court
may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his
executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts any-
here to supply goods or services in the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause
of action for defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to
person or property within the state, except as to a cause of ac-
tion for defamation of character arising from the act, if he
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue
from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the
state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have con-
sequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from
interstate or international commerce; or
4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within
the state.
(b) Personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendant in matri-
monial actions or family court proceedings. [ .... I
(c) Effect of appearance. Where personal jurisdiction is based
solely upon this section, an appearance does not confer such
jurisdiction with respect to causes of action not arising from
an act enumerated in this section.
N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302 (McKinney 1990).
218. See citations in Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. CIV 96-3620, 1997 WL
97097, at *9 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 26, 1997).
219. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y.
1996). It seems that the court did not even consider the web page as a business
advertisement within New York.
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Rules permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over
any non-domiciliary who "commits a tortious act within the
state" as long as the cause of action asserted arises from the
tortious act.22° In trademark infringement cases, the tortious
conduct occurs where the defendant offers to sell the in-
fringing product.2 ' The court found that "[i]t takes several
affirmative steps by a New York resident," to obtain access
and use the information posted on the web site.2 Thus, "the
mere fact that a person can gain information on the allegedly
infringing product is not the equivalent of a person advertis-
ing, promoting, selling or otherwise making an effort to tar-
get its product in New York."
223
The second jurisdictional basis asserted by plaintiff, sec-
tion 302(a)(3)(ii) of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules,
permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over any
non-domiciliary for tortious acts committed outside the state
that cause injury in the state if the non-domiciliary "expects
or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in
the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or
international commerce. " 24 The court asserted two reasons
why the defendant's conduct did not fall under this provi-
sion.12' First, the plaintiff did not allege that the defendant
derived substantial revenue from interstate commerce.226
Second, the plaintiff did not allege a "significant financial
loss" in the New York club based on plaintiffs web site and
did not assert defendant's foreseeability of a possible in-
fringement.2
Finally, the court held that even if jurisdiction were
proper under New York's long-arm statute, asserting juris-
diction would violate constitutional due process."' It ex-
220. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302 (McKinney 1990).
221. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
222. Id. The court described that these steps include using resident's com-
puter hard- and software, knowledge about the URL of the web site or, alterna-
tively, a "search engine." Id. Additionally, the court found that in order to buy
a ticket a user must travel to Missouri. Id.
223. Id.
224 Id.
225. MICHAEL C. SILBERBERG, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet,
N.Y.L.J. (Nov. 6, 1996) <http://www.ljx.com/internetl10796c2.html>.
226. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
227. Id.
228. Id.
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plained that the defendant has done nothing to purposefully
avail himself of the benefits of New York. 229 Defendant sim-
ply created a Web site and permitted anyone who could find
it to access it."3' According to this court, creating a site, like
placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt
nationwide-or even worldwide-but, without more, it is not
an act purposefully directed towards a forum state.23'
The court's decision in Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger.23 dis-
cussed the commission of a tort and found that the court did
not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. In Hearst,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York issued a small landmark decision regarding spe-
cific personal jurisdiction based solely on the maintenance of
a web site. After Judge Peck denied jurisdiction based on
section 301, he focused on New York's "long-arm" statute sec-
tion 302. 33 The court analyzed personal jurisdiction accord-
ing to the wording of section 302. New York's long-arm stat-
ute specifically enumerates acts which are the basis for
jurisdiction, in contrast to several other states' "broad" long-
arm statutes. "
A New York court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over any non-domiciliary who, in person or through an agent,
transacts any business within the state or contracts any-
where to supply goods or services in the state pursuant to
section 302(a)(1). 235 According to the court, section 302(a)(1)
is typically invoked for a cause of action against a defendant
229. Id. at 301.
230. Id.
231. Id. The court stated that there "are no allegations that King actively
sought to encourage New Yorkers to access his site, or that he conducted any
business.., let alone a continuous and systematic part of its business... in
New York." Bensusan Restaurant Corp., 937 F. Supp. at 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
232. Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. CIV 96-3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *1,
*10-*15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
233. Id. at *8.
234. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a) (McKinney 1990); see also N.Y.C.P.L.R. § C302:1
(McKinney 1990) (practice commentary by Joseph McLaughlin); Beacon En-
ters., Inc. v. Menzies, 715 F.2d 757, 764 n.6 (2d Cir. 1983).
235. Section 302(a) of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules provides:
As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this
section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-
domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or
through an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts any-
where to supply goods or services in the state ....
N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a) (McKinney 1990).
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who (1) breaches a contract with plaintiff or (2) commits a
commercial tort against a plaintiff in the course of transact-
ing business or contracting to supply goods or services in
New York.
3 6
The court found that defendant's activities did not in-
volve a contract, since it was undisputed that the defendant
had not sold any product or services, but rather had commit-
ted the tort of trademark infringement in the course of a
commercial activity."' Defendant's web site consisted only of
an announcement of the future availability of his web site to
"offer law office infrastructure network services for attor-
neys."138 Thus, it remained unclear what the defendant really
planned to offer. According to the decision, the defendant
neither offered any services nor sold or offered products at
the time of the filing.2"9 The only activity of relevance on the
web site at the time of the filing was an alleged illicit do-
main.140 Thus, the court found this activity "most analogous
to an advertisement in a national magazine."'
In contrast to many states, New York law is clear in
stating that advertisements in national publications are not
sufficient to provide personal jurisdiction under section
302(a)(1) of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules.242
Even advertisements targeted at the New York market have
been found insufficient to constitute a transaction of business
for jurisdiction purposes under section 302(a)(1). 43 Moreover,
the Hearst court found that the defendant's web site may be
viewed by people in all fifty states and all over the world, but
it is not targeted at the residents of New York.
44
Section 302(a)(2) of New York's Civil Practice Law and
236. Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. CIV 96-3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (citing Beacon Enters., Inc. v. Menzies, 715 F.2d 757,
764 (2d Cir. 1983)).
237. Id. at *10.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. CIV 96-3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (citing Davidson Extrusions, Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co.,
516 N.Y.S.2d 78, 79 (App. Div. 1987)).
243. Id. (citing U.S. Mexican Dev. Corp. v. Condor, No. CIV. 91-5925, 1992
WL 27179, at *3-*4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1992) ("[A] non-domiciliary's solicitation of
business or advertising within New York generally does not in and of itself con-
stitute transaction of business within the state.").
244. Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. CIV 96-3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
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Rules provides personal jurisdiction over one who commits a
tortious act within the state so long as the cause of action as-
serted arises from the tortious act.245 A trademark infringe-
ment occurs where the "passing off' occurs, i.e., where the
deceived customer buys the defendant's product in the belief
that he is buying the plaintiffs.24' However, courts have held
that an offering for sale constitutes a "passing off," and have
found the mere offer, without a sale, as sufficient to consti-
tute personal jurisdiction over the alleged infringer.247  The
Hearst court, however, stated that even if the defendant's In-
ternet web site could be considered an "offer for sale," the de-
fendant had no product or service yet available for sale.4
Therefore, the court denied jurisdiction under section
302(a)(2) based merely on his placing of the offer for future
services on the Internet.249
Finally, section 302(a)(3) provides for jurisdiction over
one who commits a tortious act outside New York, causing
injury within New York if he (1) regularly does or solicits
business, or engages in any other persistent course of con-
duct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or con-
sumed or services rendered, in the state, or (2) expects or
should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the
state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or in-
ternational commerce. 2" Although, the plaintiff did not rely
on section 302(a)(3), the court proceeded to "briefly address it
for the sake of completeness."51 The solicitation of business
under section 302(a)(3)(i) requires a regular course of busi-
ness conducted in the state, and thus, more than a "one shot"
business transaction.252 But the required solicitation of busi-
ness within New York did not exist, since the defendant had
nothing to sell. Hence, section 302(a)(3)(ii) also failed. The
court stated, that even if the present web site is considered a
solicitation, it did not occur in New York and thus, section
245. Id. at *13 (citing Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295,
299 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
246. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1956).
247. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
248. Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. CIV 96-3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *14
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
249. Id.
250. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a) (McKinney 1990).
251. Hearst Corp., 1997 WL 97097, at *14.
252. Id. at *15.
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302(a)(3)(i) is not applicable."'3  The application, would
"offend traditional notions of fair play, because it would lead
to nationwide jurisdiction over the Internet." " The court,
therefore, found that neither section 302(a) nor section 301
provided a basis for personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant. 55
In effect, the cases demonstrate that when specific juris-
diction over out-of-state content providers is based on doing
business, personal jurisdiction is found over the defendant
the majority of the time. When jurisdiction is dependent on
the defendant's commission of a tortious act within the fo-
rum, there does not appear to be a general trend toward a
finding of personal jurisdiction, rather the determination of
jurisdiction is fact specific. These findings are consistent
with the theory of this article that personal jurisdiction is
proportionate to the nature and quality of defendant's con-
tacts to the forum state. Where a defendant clearly does
business over the Internet with residents of the forum state,
the defendant has knowledge of his customers. Since the de-
fendant has knowledge of his client base, he therefore knows
the recipients of the "infringing" materials. Doing business
is a "quality" contact with the forum justifying personal ju-
risdiction.
In contrast, when dealing with the "commission of a tor-
tious act" courts have had difficulty finding personal jurisdic-
tion over content providers. One reason why courts are not
uniformly finding personal jurisdiction could be that the case
law for the commission of torts deals with the tort of libel,
and not copyright infringement. Several commentators agree
that the "effect test" used in the analysis of personal jurisdic-
tion was designed to target libelous statements, 25' and is in-
appropriate for copyright infringement actions.57 A copy-
253. Id.
254. Id. (citing Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300-01
(S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
255. Id.
256. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 783 (1984) ("Petitioners are not
charged with mere untargeted negligence, but rather their intentional, and al-
legedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California.").
257. The Hearst court declined to follow Panavision, especially with regard
to this court's use of the "effect test." Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. CIV 96-
3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997). The "effect test" focuses
on the defendant's intent, and except perhaps in the clearest case of a
"cybersquatter" or where intent is undisputed, the Hearst court stated it would
be a serious mistake for personal jurisdiction to turn on this issue. Id. The de-
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right infringer, in contrast to an author of a defamatory
statement, has no intention of causing injury in a jurisdiction
other than the one where he resides. In fact, typically, the
infringer has no knowledge as to where the author resides.
For example, if an individual copies "Microsoft Word" in
Paris on his personal computer, the copier simply does this to
avoid buying the program in a Paris store. Furthermore, if
the copier makes the software available on his Internet
server in Paris, he has no intention of causing an injury in
the State of Washington where the copyright owner resides.
Whereas in a case of libel, the statements must be made
where the plaintiff resides, or there is no injury to reputa-
tion.
Several authors have suggested alternatives to the
"effect test" since it is not well suited for copyright actions.
One commentator argued that the "stream-of-commerce the-
ory" is the best framework to use for the personal jurisdiction
inquiry, because the traditional legal framework is inade-
quate in the content provider context. 58 The "stream-of-
commerce theory" is another theory of purposeful avail-
ment.59 It has been used mainly in several product liability
cases to analyze jurisdiction over the manufacturer. How-
ever, the theory in general, and with regard to copyright in-
fringement, is more inappropriate than the traditional pur-
poseful availment analysis. The commentator herself
acknowledged that the Supreme Court expressed "only" three
different views on the stream-of-commerce theory and in the
view of many courts this has already been rejected.6 Fur-
fendant's intent is a major issue on the merits, but not a procedural one. Id.
258. Sonia Gupta, Bulletin Board Systems and Personal Jurisdiction: What
Comports with Fair Play and Substantial Justice, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519
(1996). Although she determines personal jurisdiction with regard to "BBS Op-
erators," her arguments addresses mainly the BBS Operator function of
'providing content" and somewhat the function of "providing storage for third
parties content."
259. Id. One of the several versions of the stream-of-commerce theory was
explained by Justice O'Connor:
The placement of a product in the stream of commerce, without more,
is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the suffi-
cient forum State .... Additional conduct of the defendant may indi-
cate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum
State .... But a defendant's awareness that the stream of commerce
may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not
(constitute) an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.
Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116-121 (1987).
260. Gupta, supra note 258, at 524-26. The Supreme Court expressed both a
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thermore, information on the Internet is available worldwide,
except as it is restricted. Thus, a theory based on a manufac-
tured "product" that has to be physically distributed to reach
potential plaintiffs does not fit.
Another commentator offered that instead of the "effect
test," print publication cases are appropriate for the Internet,
and thus arguably copyright infringement cases.""6 ' Several
courts already analyzed personal jurisdiction based on deci-
sions regarding print publications. This is because print
publications, like electronic ones, spread out and come in
contact with a multiplicity of jurisdictions.262 A print publica-
tion usually satisfies the minimum contacts analysis if it has
substantial circulation in the jurisdiction or if the defendant
publisher intended to cause injury in the jurisdiction."'3 A
similar minimum contacts analysis applies when the defen-
dant made tortious statements which are later published by
another.26
Another author continued with this print publication ar-
gument by stating that the use of the Internet is like placing
an advertisement in a "local" newspaper.265 The author ar-
gued that a content provider who has established a site on
the Internet intends to disseminate worldwide, the world-
wide dissemination of information is a foreseeable and inten-
tional act.66 Following this argument, if the operation of a
web site commits a tortious act in New York, such as copy-
right infringement, a defendant should be subject to specific
personal jurisdiction.2 7
But the "print publication" analogy is inappropriate for
copyright infringement actions. In a comparison to a print
publication, a copyright infringer does not receive any reve-
nue from the on-line usage, especially due to the lack of a
"narrow," and a "broad" version, and Justice Stevens refused to join either
opinion. Id. at 524-25.
261. Perritt, Jr., supra note 8, at 19. However, he finds intention only if it is
a subscription-based commercial systems like CompuServe or America On-line
and has a significant subscribers in the forum. Id.
262. Id. at 17. However, he finds intention only if it is a subscription-based
commercial system like CompuServe or America On-line, and the system has
significant subscribers in the forum. Id. at 19.
263. Id. at 18.
264. See id. (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984)).
265. Bender, supra note 8, at 41. Although he mentioned that the discussion
of the nature of the Internet was minimal. Id.
266. Id. at 32.
267. Id. (defining a defendant, the author specifically includes corporations,
but is not limited as to whether individuals would also be included).
405
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
contractual relationship with the on-line user. Furthermore,
even if an infringer wanted to make copyrighted works avail-
able to a global audience, he does not want to "distribute" the
content like a print publication. Therefore, the print publica-
tion analogy is inadequate.
In conclusion, the finding of personal jurisdiction based
on the commission of a tort in the forum state appears to be
very fact specific when dealing with copyright infringement
on the Internet.
2. Out-of-State Internet Service Provider
A second potential defendant is an out-of-state service
provider. A service provider connects either an out-of-state
server or an out-of-state individual user to the illicit material
on the Internet. A service provider merely facilitates the
connection. Unlike a content provider, a service provider has
no control over the content of the material on the Internet.
In general, it is not likely that courts will find personal juris-
diction over out-of-state Internet service provider defendants.
United States courts have found the operator of a Bulle-
tin Board Service ("BBS")268 liable for copyrighted works that
were uploaded by third parties. 69 The operator of a BBS is
parallel to an Internet service provider in that neither have
control over the content, rather both merely administrate the
connection. Arguably, a service provider could be sued, at
least for indirect copyright infringement, if the copyright
owner informed the service provider that his copyrighted
work is accessible on the Internet.270 The facts were ripe for
such a scenario in Playboy v. Chuckleberry. Possibly, the
plaintiff in Playboy could have sued a service provider as well
as the content provider, assuming that Chuckleberry leased
server space with a different company.
At this time, United States courts have never exercised
personal jurisdiction over a service provider who has no di-
rect control over the content. However, unless a service pro-
vider offers any services or products within the forum state,
it is unlikely that courts will find "purposeful availment" and
268. See supra note 77 (defining Bulletin Board Service).
269. See, e.g., Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Maphia, 984 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
270. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.Cal. 1995) (regarding indirect liability).
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thus, courts will likely not exercise personal jurisdiction,
even if the defendant is potentially liable. The decisions that
have expressly denied general jurisdiction based on the exis-
tence of a web site, seem to support the denial of general ju-
risdiction over a service provider.271
Unless a service provider has contractual relationships
with the plaintiff or third parties in the forum state, it will be
difficult for courts to find specific jurisdiction as well. If a
finding of jurisdiction is based on the "transaction of busi-
ness," personal jurisdiction is justified if the service provider
offered services to the forum's residents. This is not likely to
occur since it is not the role of the service provider to have
such direct contact with the plaintiff. For example, the de-
fendant in Granite Gates Resorts advertised to promote an
on-line gambling service, thereby offering contractual rela-
tionships to state residents."' The only way a court could
justify hailing the service provider into court is if the service
provider offered its services to the forum's residents.
Likewise, it is unlikely that a court finding personal ju-
risdiction based on a tortious act committed by the content
provider would support personal jurisdiction over the service
provider. Even if a service provider might be liable, he does
not "expressly aim" any activity at a state other than where
he is located. The "effect test," used to analyze purposeful
availment when dealing with tortious acts, is inappropriate
to determine personal jurisdiction for a service provider.273 In
Maritz, the court focused on the fact that the defendant's up-
coming interactive service would allow the forwarding of ad-
vertising messages to the subscriber, like a mailing list.27
Defendant's activity in Maritz was clearly distinguishable
from that of a service provider, who merely connects a server
or a user with the Internet. Furthermore, the arguments of
Maritz were expressly mentioned and declined by the Hearst
court because allowing personal jurisdiction based only on an
Internet web site "would be tantamount to a declaration that
this Court, and every other court throughout the world, may
271. See, e.g., Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D.
Conn. 1996). In this decision, it is unclear whether or not general or specific
jurisdiction existed. However, jurisdiction was obtained only due to the alleg-
edly infringing web site. Id. at 162-65.
272. Minnesota v. Granite Gates Resorts, Inc., CIV No. 95-7227, 1996 WL
767431, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996).
273. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
274. Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo.1996).
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assert [personal] jurisdiction over all information providers
on the global World Wide Web."27 It seems that courts real-
ized that setting up a server without any other action by the
defendant is not sufficient to establish purposeful avail-
ment.276 Thus, courts should not be able to obtain subject
matter jurisdiction over service providers.
In review, courts are not likely to find personal jurisdic-
tion over Internet service providers. This finding is consis-
tent with the suggestion of this article that the greater the
quality of contacts the defendant has with the forum state,
the greater the likelihood jurisdiction will be found. In this
context, the defendant service provider's contacts with the fo-
rum are tenuous at best. There is no direct link between the
plaintiff and the service provider. They are connected
through the content provider. Since there is not a high qual-
ity of contact between the plaintiff and a service provider de-
fendant, it is not surprising that courts would not find per-
sonal jurisdiction.
3. Out-of-State Upload
Another possible out-of-state defendant is a user who
uploads a copyrighted work to a forum states' Bulletin Board
Service ("BBS"). This scenario arose in several decisions, in-
cluding Playboy v. Frena and Sega v. Maphia.277 In both deci-
sions, copyrighted works were allegedly uploaded and down-
loaded by third parties. However, the plaintiffs sued the
"sysops,"271 or systems operator, of a BBS and not the indi-
vidual user, so the issue never became ripe before the
courts.279 In general, it is not likely that courts will find per-
275. Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. CIV 96-3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
276. Gupta, supra note 258, at 519 (regarding the set up of a BBS); Perritt,
Jr., supra note at 8, at 8 (stating that in a comparable situation (operator of an
Usenet server), the operator may have no knowledge of what items are being
offered and retrieved, and thus it is more difficult to conclude that the operator
is responsible for the contact between the content and different jurisdictions).
277. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 984 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
278. A sysop, or "system operator," is the person who runs a computer
server. The term is used mainly in the world of bulletin board services. In
general, a sysop or system operator is one who runs the day-to-day operation of
a server. See <http://whatis.com> (visited Feb. 16, 1998).
279. Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Maphia, 984 F. Supp. 923 (N.D.Cal. 1996); Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
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sonal jurisdiction over an individual defendant who is an out-
of-state user who uploaded infringing material.
One court has addressed an action where the plaintiff
sued the user of a remote database or network. In Plus Sys-
tem v. New England Network,28 ° a Colorado court exercised
personal jurisdiction over a New England regional automatic
teller machine ("ATM") network. The Plus System court
based jurisdiction upon the defendant's computer communi-
cations with plaintiffs computer in Colorado, a licensing con-
tract, and visits by defendant's representative to Colorado to
initiate the business relationship with plaintiff."' However,
the decision contains no support for future courts to exercise
jurisdiction over a user who has uploaded a copyrighted
work. The Plus System court carefully noted that the defen-
dant "availed itself of the State of Colorado by means which
might be of insufficient quantum to justify personal jurisdic-
tion if considered individually, but which clearly rise to pur-
poseful availment when viewed collectively."282 Moreover, the
five year contractual relationship in Plus System has no
similarities with the Internet, other than the fact that the
communications occurred via a "telephone cable." Plus Sys-
tem provides insight that a court would probably not find
personal jurisdiction over a user who has uploaded a copy-
righted work since the mere use of a remote server is proba-
bly an "insufficient quantum" of evidence in itself to justify
such a finding. Therefore, a finding of personal jurisdiction
for this type of defendant is not likely.
In effect, courts are not likely to find personal jurisdic-
tion over an individual defendant who is an out-of-state user
who uploaded infringing material. This finding is consistent
with the suggestion of this article that the greater the quality
of contacts the defendant has with the forum state, the
greater the likelihood jurisdiction will be found. In this con-
text, the defendant's only contact with the forum is his post-
ing on the BBS. This act is too remote to justify personal ju-
risdiction. Since there is not a high quality of contact
between the plaintiff and the defendant, courts should not
find personal jurisdiction over this type of defendant.
280. Plus Sys., Inc. v. New England Network, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 111 (D. Colo.
1992).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 118.
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B. Electronic Mail Communication
The second major category is communication by elec-
tronic mail ("e-mail"). E-mail communication differs from
that of a Web server in that a recipient of e-mail is passive
when using this method of communication. It is a third party
that forwards the mail and hence initiates the transmission.
This third party can be an individual third person or an
automated mailing list server that automatically forwards
any mail to the user. The user only receives the transmission
passively.
The sender of a copyrighted work is a direct copyright in-
fringer."3 If he is located in the forum state, courts likely
have subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.
However, the mere reception of a copyrighted work via e-mail
should not be considered a direct copyright infringement.
Thus, courts cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction just
because the recipient is physically located in the forum state.
Since a finding of jurisdiction focuses on the nature and
quality of defendant's conduct over the Internet toward the
forum state, this article suggests that courts should focus on
how much control the sender has over the where, if and by
whom his work is received. The more control the sender has,
the more likely courts should find personal jurisdiction over
the sender in the forum the copyrighted work was received.
An examination of the case law supports this article's
theory. When examining the case law, it is important to keep
in mind that none of the cases have explicitly addressed the
issue of e-mail and personal jurisdiction."' Although some
courts have exercised personal jurisdiction over out-of-state
defendants based on phone calls or electronic communication,
virtually all of them involved libelous or defamatory state-
285ment actions, or actions based on contractual relation-
283. See Sega Enters., 984 F. Supp. at 931 ("The Ninth Circuit has held that
"copying," for the purposes of copyright law, occurs when a computer program
is transferred from permanent storage device to a computer's random access
memory.").
284. Another pragmatic reason that it is difficult to rely on the existing case
law for some consistency is that the forwarding of a tangible copyrighted work
via the mail is not illicit, unless it is a distribution to the public under 17
U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994). Furthermore, the work could be an infringing importa-
tion under 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1994).
285. Compare the decisions in Gassman, supra note 8, at 563.
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ships.286 In these cases, personal jurisdiction was based on
the situs of the defamatory statements or the location of the
contracts; the existence of e-mail communication was only in-
cidental to a finding of personal jurisdiction. Nonetheless, in
cases that involved more control by the sender, the emphasis
on the e-mail communication was greater than cases where
the sender had little control over where the copyrighted in-
formation was received.
The cases seem to divide into two classes defined by the
party transmitting the e-mail. There is the individual third
person who sends an e-mail to a specific person or an auto-
mated mailing list server that automatically forwards the
mail to any user. The individual transmitter typically has at
least some knowledge of and control over who receives his e-
mail. Moreover, it is likely that a recipient can identify the
place of origin of the mailing. Therefore, a finding of per-
sonal jurisdiction for this type of defendant is more likely. In
contrast, an automated mailing list server automatically for-
wards mail to any user on its list. This defendant has less
knowledge as to the recipient of his e-mail and likewise it is
more difficult for the recipient to identify the source of the
mailing. It is less likely that a court will find personal juris-
diction over a defendant that uses this type of communica-
tion.
The case of Cody v. Ward287 presented an interesting
question of personal jurisdiction analysis. The District Court
for the District of Connecticut exercised personal jurisdiction
over an out-of-state resident in an action for fraudulent mis-
representation under the Connecticut Uniform Securities
Act.288 In Cody, the defendant used both e-mail, phone calls,
and an automated mailing server, Prodigy.288 The defendant
posted 225 messages on Prodigy's on-line discussion forum
"Money Talk" encouraging people to buy or hold shares of
stock of the E.N. Phillips Company, telephoned the plaintiff
four times, and sent the plaintiff fifteen e-mailsY °
The Connecticut court discussed the application of the
286. See, e.g., Plus Sys., Inc. v. New England Network, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 111
(D. Colo. 1992).
287. Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43 (D. Conn. 1997).
288. Id. at 47.
289. Id. at 45.
290. Id.
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forum state's long-arm statute291 for transmitted misrepre-
sentations.92 Due to the forum state's lack of precedent, the
court looked to the New York long arm statute for guidance,
and stated that, under this statute, most courts in New York
have declined to exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents for
out-of-state misrepresentations. 93 Declining to follow this
approach, the Cody court asserted jurisdiction over the de-
fendant under Connecticut's long-arm statute, merely be-
cause many other states have asserted jurisdiction for
transmitted misrepresentations.294
The Cody court found that the purposeful availment fac-
tor was met by the defendant as well. 99 However, the court
expressly based the exercise of jurisdiction on misrepresenta-
tions made "to the plaintiff in a series of telephone calls and
e-mails."296 This article suggests that the court ruled this
way because in a telephone call or a direct e-mail, the defen-
dant has knowledge and control over whom is the recipient of
the e-mail. This relationship was based on the defendant's
knowledge about plaintiffs physical location. 97 Thus, the
court concluded that the defendant's contacts with the plain-
tiff in Connecticut were substantial enough that he should
reasonably have anticipated being sued here, especially if the
plaintiff lost nearly $200,000.598
The court stated that it was "unnecessary to decide
whether the defendant's Prodigy messages should be counted
as purposeful contacts with Connecticut." 9 In contrast to
the e-mail and phone calls, the defendant would have no
knowledge as to where his messages would be transmitted on
Prodigy. Therefore, this decision gives no support for an ac-
tion of copyright infringement based only via a mailing list
server like Prodigy. Furthermore, this finding supports the
theory of this article. Even though there were 225 messages
sent by the defendant on the Prodigy system, (in contrast to
291. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-59b(a)(2) (1969) (codified as amended 1982 P.A.
82-160 § 16).
292. Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 45, 46 (D. Conn. 1997).
293. Id. at 46.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 46-47.
296. Id. at 47.
297. Id. at 45, 47.
298. Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 45, 47 (D. Conn. 1997).
299. Id. at 47.
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the four phone and fifteen e-mail messages) since the defen-
dant had no knowledge of the recipient of these Prodigy mes-
sages, the court did not find jurisdiction based on those
transmissions.
The case of Resuscitation Technologies v. Continental
Health Care... addressed merely the first type of e-mail com-
munication-e-mail from an individual third person to a
known plaintiff."' The actual finding of jurisdiction was
based on much more than electronic mail communication.
The parties forwarded some eighty e-mails, communicated
via telephone, and fax.3 °  The parties did have knowledge
about the physical location of the other party.3  The court
found that the goal of the interaction between the parties
"was to combine their resources to form a new company.
The court found this interaction to equal a "quasi-business
relationship" and determined personal jurisdiction existed on
the basis of this business relationship. The court held
"[without question... [defendants] reached beyond the
boundaries of their own state to do business in Indiana."
311
Therefore, the mere fact that an intensive business relation-
ship included e-mail, cannot be used to support a finding of
personal jurisdiction. But, consistent with the theory of this
article, where the defendant has knowledge as to the recipi-
ent of his e-mail, a court is more likely to find personal juris-
diction over this type of defendant.
In Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access Inc.,S36 the
defendant was an out-of state computer-information user
who had a contractual business relationship with the plain-
tiff. The defendant did have knowledge or control over the
recipients of his e-mail communication. Yet, the court still
found personal jurisdiction over this computer-information
user based on the physical location of the server.0 7 It would
appear that this finding would be inconsistent with the the-
ory of this article because, arguably, it is impossible to locate
300. Resuscitation Techs., Inc. v. Continental Health Care Corp., No. IP 96-
1457-C-MIS, 1997 WL 148567, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 1997).
301. Id.
302. Id. at *2.
303. Id.
304. Id. at *5.
305. Id. at *6.
306. Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351, 1353
(D. App. Fla. 1994).
307. Id.
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the computer-information user. But, it is arguably foresee-
able that a database server is located at the mailing or busi-
ness address of the server. For example, WESTLAW's server
might be in Eagen, Minnesota and LEXIS/NEXIS might be
located in Dayton, Ohio. Therefore, the physical location of
the mailing list server is inadequate for a finding of personal
jurisdiction.
Even in a situation where the physical location of the
subscriber and the mailing list server is identical, according
to Henry H. Perritt, Jr., the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over a defendant who has posted illicit material is inappro-
priate.0 8 Perritt indicated that one who posts on the Internet
has no knowledge of the extent of the list and thus the
"dissemination of this posting to a particular person is usu-
ally neither purposeful nor foreseeable."" 9 He concluded that
absent special circumstances, the exercise of personal juris-
diction is inappropriate if based only on the dissemination of
messages through the list.
In sum, in cases where the individual transmittor typi-
cally has at least some knowledge of and control over who re-
ceives his e-mail, and it is likely that the recipient can iden-
tify the place of origin of the mailing, a finding of personal
jurisdiction for this type of defendant is more likely. In con-
trast, where a defendant is an automated mailing list server
which automatically forwards mail to any user on its list,
this defendant has less knowledge as to the recipient of his e-
mail and likewise it is more difficult for the recipient to iden-
tify the source of the mailing. It is less likely that a court
will find personal jurisdiction over a mailing list server de-
fendant. There are several pragmatic reasons why courts
should not find personal jurisdiction over these mailing list
defendants simply based on their e-mail communications.
Almost all mailing lists forward articles, including text and
pictures, and, thus, copyrighted works. Many authors who
disseminate their copyrighted works on mailing lists, enjoy a
broad use of their works. This type of communication could
be destroyed if a reply to an article could result in personal
jurisdiction in a out-of-state forum if, for example, the reply
contained too many parts of an article. Therefore, the dis-
semination of copyrighted works through a mailing list
308. Perritt, Jr., supra note 8, at 20.
309. Id.
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should not result in a finding of personal jurisdiction.
C. Usenet
The third major category is communication by the
Usenet.1 ° The Usenet is a combination of the other two
methods if communication over the Internet, the Web Server
and electronic mail. A user actively post articles to be dis-
tributed automatically by a Usenet server to another Usenet
server. However, in order to receive an article, a user has to
access the server and to select the file he wants to view.
While using the Usenet the user is both active and passive
with the transmission.
The foregoing analysis of dissemination over electronic
mail communication and Web servers illustrated that per-
sonal jurisdiction is even less appropriate if an out-of-state
user has posted a copyrighted work on a Usenet server,
311
where it will be automatically disseminated on Usenet serv-
ers throughout the world. The author who posted a work on
the Usenet has no knowledge and control where, if, and by
whom the work will be retrieved. Personal jurisdiction over
the user who posted the message would have, in the words of
the court in Playboy a "devastating impact on those who use
this global service."312 Furthermore, the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the user would be a declaration that the
court may assert jurisdiction over all information, or at least
all information on the Usenet.313
In this context, Perritt argued that "the act resulting in
the receipt of the message in a particular place is the act, not
of the publisher, but of the retriever."1 ' He stated that dis-
semination "in these circumstances should not subject the
publisher to personal jurisdiction in places where the infor-
mation is retrieved."31 ' Therefore, unless the publisher has
other contacts to the forum state, courts should not be able to
exercise personal jurisdiction merely based on his activity on
the Usenet.
310. See <http://whatis.com> (visited Feb. 16, 1998) (defining "Usenet").
311. Id.
312. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032,
1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
313. The Playboy court expressly denied such a holding. Playboy Enters.,
Inc., 939 F. Supp. at 1040.
314. Perritt, Jr., supra note 8, at 20.
315. Id.
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That courts have not found personal jurisdiction based
on use over the Usenet is consistent with the theory of this
article. A finding of personal jurisdiction should be propor-
tionate to the nature and quality of activity the defendant
conduct over the Internet. When examining the Usenet, the
quality of contacts over the Internet is poor since the defen-
dant has no knowledge or control over where, if, and by
whom the infringing work would be retrieved. Therefore, not
surprisingly, courts did not exercise personal jurisdiction
over the defendant when the method of communication was
the Usenet.
IV. CONCLUSION
In effect, courts have little experience in resolving the
appropriateness of personal jurisdiction in cases involving
copyright infringement on the Internet. Thus, the personal
jurisdiction analysis regarding Internet activities is highly
uncertain and unpredictable. The analysis depends heavily
on the individual facts and circumstances.
However, courts should not be able to obtain personal ju-
risdiction over individual users who transmit allegedly copy-
316righted works by a mailing list, on Usenet newsgroups, or
upload them to remote servers within the forum state. Fur-
thermore, courts should not be able to exercise personal ju-
risdiction over out-of-state Internet service providers. The
likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally
exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality
of the activity that the defendant conducts over the Inter-
net. 17 Moreover, except in rare cases where a business oper-
ates only over the Internet, such as a search engine, it is un-
likely that courts will find general jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant. Therefore, courts have to focus on specific
jurisdiction.
Thus, the following sliding scale represents a basic per-
sonal jurisdiction principle. At one end of the sliding scale is
a situation where a defendant clearly does business over the
Internet with the forum state's residents. If the defendant
enters into a contract with residents of a foreign jurisdiction
over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. Courts
316. See supra note 78 (defining newsgroup).
317. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D.
Penn. 1997).
416 [Vol. 38
19981 PERSONAL JURISDICTION ON INTERNET
should be able to exercise personal jurisdiction if a contract
exists and copyrighted works are accessible on-line.
At the opposite end of the scale is a situation where a de-
fendant has simply posted copyrighted works on a BBS that
is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. The passive
web site (a site that does little more than make information
available to anyone interested) should not be considered suf-
ficient for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
Finally, in the middle of the scale exists a very fact spe-
cific scenario pertaining to an interactive remote server.318
When the user can do more than merely accessing content,
such as exchanging information with the host computer, the
exercise of jurisdiction should be determined by an examina-
tion of several factors, such as the level of interactivity, the
commercial nature of the service, and the amount of (illicit)
information available. Under this analysis, the operator of
the remote server offering interactive services faces personal
jurisdiction if the server provides information that allegedly
contains copyrighted works that can be accessed from the fo-
rum state.
318. For example, see the service in Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F.
Supp. 1328, 1330 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
417

